MCP Insights by Mission Critical Partners

MCP to the FCC: Put Operational Readiness at the Center of 911 Modernization

Written by John Chiaramonte | November 21, 2026

Responding to the FCC’s request for comments, MCP suggests that a national framework is needed more than ever, one that pairs new emergency communications capabilities with operational readiness, accountability, and local authority

Technology providers increasingly can send a wide expanse of information into the 911 ecosystem, often without the receiving agencies having a say regarding whether they want it, can use it, or are prepared to manage it.

For example, connected vehicles, wearable devices, sensors, applications, and artificial intelligence (AI) can generate alerts, interpret information, and deliver data to public-safety agencies without anyone actively requesting help. These capabilities offer opportunities to improve emergency response. But they also raise a critical question: Who determines whether, how, and under what conditions such communications enter the 911 environment?

Recognizing that the emergency-response world has changed dramatically, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) issued a Notice of Inquiry (NOI) regarding modernization of the 911 framework. This article summarizes the comments of Mission Critical Partners (MCP), chief among them a phased national approach with a straightforward central principle: New capabilities must be reliable, interoperable, secure, and operationally manageable for the agencies responsible for responding to emergencies.

Read MCP's full comments here

Recommendation 1: Make Operational Readiness an Explicit Objective

The FCC’s inquiry identifies three core objectives: ensuring reliable and accessible 911 communications, supporting public safety’s receipt of information needed for effective response, and promoting innovation while accounting for feasibility and implementation guardrails.

MCP supports those objectives and recommends another: Emergency communications and related information must be actionable and governable by the receiving 911 authority.

That distinction matters because receiving information does not guarantee that telecommunicators can understand, prioritize, or use it safely. A Next Generation 911 (NG911) interface capable of accepting data should not constitute blanket consent to receive every data type, from every source, at any volume.

Each delivery needs a defined purpose, identifiable source, appropriate delivery method, and, most importantly, a recipient equipped to act.

Recommendation 2: Four Categories of Emergency Communications 

MCP recommends distinguishing four categories of emergency communications:

  1. Human-initiated requests

  2. Device-assisted requests involving human confirmation

  3. Fully automated communications and 

  4. Supplemental or unsolicited emergency data.

The final two categories deserve particular attention. A machine-generated alert may help someone who is incapacitated or in danger. However, it also can shift critical decisions to a provider’s detection logic, data sources, and software updates. False alerts and unnecessary data can consume resources and increase workloads.

Safeguards governing these communications must preserve direct human access to help. A person seeking emergency assistance should not face delays because a provider has not completed a new data-integration process. The framework should address automated ingress separately from someone’s active request for assistance.

Recommendation 3: Define Responsibilities by Function and Impact

Legacy 911 scope criteria emphasized real-time voice service, connection to the public switched telephone network (PTSN), competition with traditional telephone services, consumer expectations, and feasibility. MCP recommends replacing that approach with criteria centered on function and impact.

The controlling question should be whether a service enables emergency assistance or materially affects the information, routing, delivery, reliability, or response associated with that request.

This approach would account for multimedia, data-only communications, and specialized offerings that influence 911 without competing with telephone service. It also would recognize the responsibilities of operating systems, applications, cloud services, and algorithms that control critical parts of the emergency-communications pathway.

Further, a modern framework should establish common functional requirements across technologies while tailoring safeguards to different service types.

Automatic callback information and location suitable for routing and dispatch remain essential. Comparable expectations should apply to entities supplying emergency location information, whether that information accompanies a call or arrives via another pathway.

Minimum requirements also should address source identity, authentication, delivery status, failure handling, security, and logging for troubleshooting and incident reconstruction. Recontact capabilities should fit the communication type. Technologies creating greater uncertainty, false-alert risk, or data burdens should face additional safeguards appropriate to those characteristics.

Recommendation 4: Build a Phased National Pathway

MCP’s proposed framework begins with a common national taxonomy, baseline service profiles, and qualification requirements developed in collaboration with public-safety agencies, standards organizations, technology providers, accessibility advocates, and other stakeholders.

For automated communications, baseline information should identify who or what initiated the contact and whether a person confirmed it. Other elements include event type, timestamps, source information, location provenance, and mechanisms for recontact, cancellation, correction, and updates. Agencies also need to distinguish raw observations from device-generated values and AI interpretations.

Before broad deployment, providers of higher-risk machine-initiated communications should demonstrate standards conformance and meaningful end-to-end testing. MCP does not prescribe a single certification mechanism. Rather, the firm emphasizes that the ability to transmit cannot establish operational safety by itself.

The second phase would coordinate deployment with the appropriate 911 authority. Depending on system architecture and applicable law, that authority may operate at the state, territorial, tribal, regional, or local level.

A national framework should support consistent evaluations without requiring every emergency communications center (ECC) to assess every type of communication independently. Receiving authorities nevertheless need tools to phase, filter, prioritize, pause, or otherwise manage new categories of automated traffic.

These controls should follow transparent, standards-based policies and preserve direct human requests for help. Their purpose is to prevent unexpected traffic, excessive cognitive demands, and unusable information from disrupting emergency operations.

The third phase would establish a practical feedback loop connecting public-safety agencies with originating providers. Agencies need a consistent way to report duplicate alerts, false activations, misrouting, unavailable recontact, and other failures.

Accountability must continue after deployment. Changes to algorithms, interfaces, routing, data sources, or delivery volumes can affect operations quickly and widely.

MCP recommends advance notice where practicable, regression and interoperability testing, documented fallback behavior, and a reliable way to contact the responsible provider. Providers should use reported problems to measure performance and correct harmful behavior.

Recommendation 5: Make AI’s Role and Uncertainty Visible

MCP distinguishes AI used within a public-safety agency from AI operating upstream to initiate, interpret, transform, prioritize, or transmit emergency communications.

Agency tools supporting transcription, translation, analytics, and other functions must adhere to local governance and operational practices. Upstream AI creates different concerns because it may determine whether an emergency exists or decide what information a public-safety agency receives.

Receiving agencies must know whether content represents a caller’s original statement, device data, an automated classification, or an AI interpretation. An AI summary or priority score must not conceal uncertainty or appear indistinguishable from verified information. Performance evaluation, incident logging, correction processes, and change controls are essential.

Related reading: How Agencies Should Evaluate Public Safety AI Vendors

Recommendation 6: Evaluate Readiness and Costs Across the Entire System

Feasibility must encompass the complete emergency communications ecosystem. A provider’s ability to send data does not establish that an ECC can display, interpret, record, secure, retain, share, and/or act on it.

Assessments should address dispatch and mapping integration, staffing, training, cybersecurity, accessibility, procurement, and ongoing support. Readiness should be evaluated for each service profile and workflow — i.e., an NG911 transition does not imply acceptance of every future automated contact or data type. This approach also recognizes that public-safety agencies have different capabilities and resources, enabling progress without requiring every ECC to reach the same level of readiness at the same time.

MCP also urges that new capabilities should not shift costs to 911 authorities by default. Upstream providers should bear originating, compliance, transport, and delivery costs to the authority’s designated delivery point, with agency cost recovery only where expressly supported by applicable state law or regulation.

Modernization succeeds when innovation strengthens the work of telecommunicators and field responders. MCP’s proposal connects national standards with operational control, testing, and ongoing accountability to help ensure that new capabilities support timely, effective emergency response.

Conclusion

The future of 911 undoubtedly will include more automation, more connected devices, and more AI-generated information. The question is not whether these technologies will reach ECCs, but whether the FCC and 911 community collaboratively establish appropriate safeguards before they do.

Innovation should not be measured simply by what technology providers can deliver to the 911 community. It should be measured by whether those capabilities improve emergency response without compromising reliability, overwhelming telecommunicators, or shifting new burdens onto already resource-constrained public-safety agencies.

That is the balance MCP is asking the FCC to establish.

John Chiaramonte is president of MCP’s enterprise AI strategy division; previously, he was president of the firms Consulting Services division. Email him at JohnChiaramonte@MissionCriticalPartners.com.

Theresa Reese, ENP, a senior technology specialist at Mission Critical Partners with 40 years of telecommunications experience, including nearly three decades focused on 911, also contributed to the comments and this post.